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NOTE
SPA-CIFIC JURISDICTION: A MASSAGE IN
BARBADOS PERPETUATES IMPROPER ANALYSIS
OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN U.S. COURTS
Jonathan P. Diffley+
A lawyer slips in the shower. The story of O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel
Co. I may begin like a bad joke, but it ends with a serious opinion out of the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that perpetuates a critical flaw in the
way most federal courts determine the constitutionality of asserting personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.
2
When a court reaches beyond its borders and exerts its judicial authority
over a person in another state or country, it extends its jurisdiction beyond
traditional territorial limitations and interferes with the neighboring state's
sovereignty. 3 To ensure that a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant does not violate a person's right to due process, U.S.
courts are required to first establish a sufficient relationship between the out-
of-state actor and the forum state.4 Only then can a court legitimately hale
alien litigants into its state.
5
+ B.A., Political Science, The University of Notre Dame; J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The
Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The author would like to thank his
editors, Marko Cimbaljevich and Christopher Copenhaver; expert reader, Professor Heather
Elliott; and all of those students listed on this publication's masthead whose tireless effort and
thoughtful insight made this Note's publication possible. The author would also like to
acknowledge the unwavering support he has received from his wife, Sallymarie, for whom this
Note is dedicated.
1. 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007).
2. See infra Part 111.
3. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (discussing that each state is an
independent sovereign that may exercise jurisdiction within its territorial bounds to the exclusion
of all other states). Traditionally, a state was seen to exercise complete control over the property
and people within its territory, to "the exclusion of power from all others." Id
4. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945). There are two categories
of relation between actor and forum state that qualify for personal jurisdiction. See infra notes
42-49 and accompanying text. If the relationship is continuous and systematic it is assessed
under the sub-doctrine of general personal jurisdiction. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136
(1966). If the relation does not constitute an ongoing relationship, but is instead fleeting, it is
assessed under the sub-doctrine of specific personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1144-45.
5. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. This limitation protects two separate concerns. First, it
protects would-be defendants from the undue burden of litigating disputes in a "distant [and]
inconvenient forum." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92
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Although the Supreme Court has instructed that an out-of-state defendant
must have minimum contacts with the forum state, 6 federal courts are divided
over what constitutes a sufficient relationship, especially when the contact is
tenuous. As a result, personal jurisdiction is exercised with great irregularity
across the country. 8 This incongruity is largely due to the way the doctrine of
personal jurisdiction is codified in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.9 Instead of providing federal courts with a uniform approach to
personal jurisdiction, Rule 4(k) directs courts to follow the laws of the states in
which they reside.10  Predictably, this acquiescence to the whims of state
legislatures has created a significant disharmony among the federal circuit
courts,1 1 which has yet to be rectified by the Supreme Court.
12
Currently, federal courts employ any one of four distinct approaches for
determining what constitutes minimum contacts for the purposes of specific
personal jurisdiction.1 3  This inconsistency puts companies doing business
(1980). Second, it preserves some semblance of autonomy among governments, both foreign and
domestic. Id. at 292.
6. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318-19 (implying that in order to qualify as a minimum contact,
the litigation must arise out of or substantially connect to activities by the defendant that are
purposely directed within the forum state).
7. See Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 102 (3d Cir. 2004) (Scirica, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that "[t]he courts of appeals have adopted divergent
interpretations of 'arise out of or relate to"' with regard to specific jurisdiction).
8. See id at 102-04 (describing the many divergent views among the federal circuit
courts). For a further discussion of the various terms used to describe the relationship satisfying
minimum contacts, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) ("Serv[ice] ... establishes personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.., who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where
the district court is located ... .
10. Id.
11. See Robert J. Condlin, "Defendant Veto" or "Totality of the Circumstances "? It's Time
for the Supreme Court to Straighten out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, 54
CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 53 (2004) ("Commentators frequently claim that there is no single, coherent
doctrine of extra-territorial personal jurisdiction, and unfortunately, they are correct." (footnote
omitted)); see also Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 179 n.34 ("[T]he Court has not developed a clear
theoretical basis for personal jurisdiction.").
12. See, e.g., Mass. Sch. of Law v. ABA., 142 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 522
U.S. 907 (1997) (denying writ of certiorari for appeal regarding personal jurisdiction); Nowak v.
Tak How Inv., 94 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155 (1997) (affirming the
lower court's denial of personal jurisdiction); see also Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v. Shute, 499
U.S. 585, 589, 595 (1991) (reversing on other grounds and refraining from considering the
personal jurisdiction issue); Shoppers Food Warehouse MD Corp. v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 322
(D.C. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1270 (2000) (holding that the court has personal jurisdiction).
13. See infra Part I.B.l-4 and corresponding footnotes. According to the Supreme Court,
specific personal jurisdiction is established when a claim arises from or relates to a contact
purposefully directed at the forum state. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945). Where the defendant "enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state," the
district court presiding in that state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id
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across state and national borders in a precarious position, with no way of
predicting whether they are exposed to liability from one jurisdiction to the
next.
14
Under most circumstances, a court has little sympathy for defendants
claiming ignorance of their liability, 15 but in a matter of personal jurisdiction,
"predictability" is a paramount factor.' 6  The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require a "degree of
predictability" with regard to personal jurisdiction so that would-be defendants
can adjust their conduct to avoid or avail themselves of liability as they so
choose. 1 7
In the law's current discordant condition, even federal judges are unable to
predict whether certain conduct establishes specific personal jurisdiction in
their states.' 8  Thus, it is completely unreasonable to expect far less
sophisticated parties, such as small foreign companies, to manage their
exposure with any degree of certainty.' 9
Both the facts and outcome of O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel epitomize the
problem with the federal system's incongruent approach to specific personal
jurisdiction.20 A couple from Pennsylvania booked a vacation at Sandy Lane
Hotel in Barbados. 21  Upon receipt of the reservation, the hotel mailed a
14. See Notes from the Margin, Barbados' Sandy Lane Hotel Sued - Does Pennsylvania
Law Apply?, http://notesfromthemargin.wordpress.com/2007/08/07/barbados-sandy-lane-hotel-
sued-does-pennsylvania-law-apply.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2008) (expressing concern over the
implications of O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co. for foreign companies selling services to
American citizens).
15. See United States v. Marquardo, 149 F.3d 36, 42 n.3 (1st Cir. 1998) ("We restate the
age-old principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense to its violation."). Under common
law, a person unaware of a law may not escape culpability for violating that law merely because
of his or her ignorance. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 27 (1769).
16. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (finding it
critical that a "defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."); see also Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal.,
436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
17. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 2007)
(reversing the lower court's ruling that the court lacked personal jurisdiction); Miller Yacht Sales,
Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing the district court's order and dismissing
the case for lack of personal jurisdiction); Third Nat'l Bank v. Wedge Group Inc., 882 F.2d 1087,
1092 (6th Cir. 1989) (reversing the lower court's ruling dismissing the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction); Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 1964) (reversing
the lower court's decision that it lacked personal jurisdiction).
19. See Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 462 (1st Cir. 1990). This opinion
adopted a famous Winston Churchill quote to describe the concept of personal jurisdiction as it is
currently established by the Supreme Court, saying the concept is "'a riddle wrapped in a mystery
inside an enigma."' Id.
20. See infra Part III.
21. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 315-16.
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brochure to the couple's home.22 Prompted by the brochure, Mr. O'Connor
made reservations for a massage at the hotel's spa through a series of phone
calls to and from the hotel in early 2003.23 Regrettably, when Mr. O'Connor
visited the spa that February, he slipped in the shower and was badly injured.24
Upon the couple's return home from Barbados, they filed a suit against the
hotel for negligence.25 The litigation was brought in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, even though Sandy Lane Hotel
did not hold a Pennsylvania business license, or maintain any employees,
assets, or other tangible presence in the commonwealth. 26  The case was
initially dismissed in the federal district court for lack of personal jurisdiction,
but, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the lower court's order.
27
In O'Connor, the Third Circuit attempted to write a scholarly,
comprehensive opinion that explained when specific personal jurisdiction
could properly be extended to out-of-state litigants.28  Unfortunately, the
opinion failed to clarify the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. 29  Moreover,
O'Connor only perpetuated the improper analysis of specific personal
jurisdiction employed by many federal courts across the country.
30
This Note critiques the imprudent approach toward specific personal
jurisdiction presented by the Third Circuit in O'Connor. Part I discusses prior




25. Id. Though only Mr. O'Connor suffered the fall in the shower, both he and Mrs.
O'Connor were listed as plaintiffs in the suit. Id. at 317 n.3 ("Mrs. O'Connor alleges loss of
consortium ... [which] is 'purely derivative' of her husband's negligence claim."). Derivative
suits are brought by those who have not suffered any direct injury, and therefore, tie any and all
rights to recovery directly to the injured plaintiff's claims. See, e.g., Scattaregia v. Wu, 495 A.2d
552, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("[B]ecause a loss of consortium action has been viewed as
derivative its success ... has always been dependent upon the injured spouse's right to recover.").
Thus in O'Connor, the court did not analyze the two claims separately. See O'Connor, 496 F.3d
at 317 n.3.
26. Id. at 315-16. The district court identified all contacts Sandy Lane had within the state
of Pennsylvania. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., No. 04-2436, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7397, at
*5-11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2005), rev'd, 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007). These included five visits by
representatives to Philadelphia with the Barbados Tourist Board, periodic newsletter mailings,
and the maintenance of a website and toll-free phone number. Id. There is no allegation that the
hotel kept employees, property, or other assets within the state. Id.
27. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 315. The court's opinion was unanimous. Id.
28. See Shannon P. Duffy, Firm Founder's Shower Fall Leads to Significant Jurisdiction
Ruling at 3rd Circuit (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticles/Friendly.jsp?id=
90005556574.
29. See Braham Boyce Ketcham, Related Contacts for Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Defendants: Adopting a Two Part Test, TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forth.
2008) ("[T]he O'Connor decision does little to unify the disparate Circuit [sic] positions.").
30. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317-25.
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elucidates the four modem methods by which lower courts have applied the
doctrine. Part II discusses the facts and procedural posture leading up to
O'Connor. It recapitulates the court's interpretation of specific personal
jurisdiction and its approach for identifying minimum contacts. Part III
demonstrates how the O'Connor decision misapplied the prior law and further
obfuscated the proper approach for determining whether federal judges can
justly hale out-of-state litigants into their courtrooms.
I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT, COMMON LAW, AND ACADEMIC INFLUENCE
ON SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The paramount role of government is to ensure the protection of its citizens
and the security of their property. 31 Accordingly, U.S. courts have a "manifest
interest" in providing citizens with a forum to seek redress from injury.
32
Under certain circumstances, a court's jurisdiction can extend to parties who
have never set foot within the boundaries of the forum state.33  Personal
jurisdiction is the doctrine that distinguishes those who are properly subject to
a court's jurisdiction.34
The seminal case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington established the
foundation for the present-day personal jurisdiction test.35 International Shoe
31. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 378 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1689) ("[P]reservation of
property... [is ]the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society .... ); 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press
1966) ("One great obj[ec]t of Gov[emmen]t is personal protection and the security of Property
32. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) (quoting McGee v. Int'l
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
33. See GEOFFERY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 145-47 (9th ed.
2005). Personal jurisdiction, otherwise known as in personam or territorial jurisdiction, provides
a court with the power to exert its judicial authority over a person. Id. at 145. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure require courts to follow the state guidelines for what constitutes personal
jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9. Some states, such as New York, have
codified requirements that specific elements be established to subject an out-of-state defendant to
personal jurisdiction in New York. See N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE LAW & RULES § 302(a)(1)
(McKinney 2001) (establishing personal jurisdiction over those who transact business within the
state of New York or contract anywhere else to provide goods or services to customers or
business associates within the state, so long as the cause of action arises out of that contract).
States such as Pennsylvania, however, limit their long-arm statutes only by the parameters
established in the U.S. Constitution. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322(b) (West 2004)
(providing that personal jurisdiction may be "based on the most minimum contact with th[e]
Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States"). If the O'Connor dispute
was argued before a federal court in New York, or another state with a similarly itemized long-
arm statute, it is conceivable that a court may have reached entirely different results. See supra
text accompanying notes 6-9.
34. See HAZARD, supra note 33, at 145.
35. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); see Comment, Burger King's
Bifurcated Test for Personal Jurisdiction: The Reasonableness Inquiry Impedes Judicial
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was the first Supreme Court case to expand the scope of personal jurisdiction
beyond the requirement of a litigant's physical presence within the court's
jurisdictional boundaries. 36 Instead of physicality, the Court relied upon much
more enigmatic concepts of presence by adopting the phrase "minimum
contacts" as the touchstone of personal jurisdiction.37
Furthermore, International Shoe pegged the limits of personal jurisdiction to
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.38  In International
Shoe, the Supreme Court found that due process did not require physical
presence, but rather that a defendant need only have "minimum contacts" with
the forum state to such a degree as to "not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.',39  This spawned the two prongs of personal
jurisdiction: minimum contacts and reasonableness.4°
Economy and Threatens a Defendant's Due Process Rights, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 945, 945 (1993)
[hereinafter Burger King 's Bifurcated Test]; see also B. Glenn George, In Search Of General
Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (1990) (calling International Shoe the seminal case "on
personal jurisdiction"); Note, Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH: The Long-Arm Statute as a
Protectionist Device, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 323, 323 (1982) (explaining International Shoe's
effect).
36. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877), but
also expanding the concept of personal jurisdiction to out-of-state defendants who have minimum
contacts with the forum state). Historically, a defendant's presence within the territory of the
court was a "prerequisite" to a binding judgment. Id. In addition to the physical presence of the
defendant, courts could also exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants who had property
within the boundaries of the forum state. Compare Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977)
(finding that there is a long history of establishing personal jurisdiction over a nonresident based
solely on the presence of his or her property within the forum state), with Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S.
215, 222-23 (1905) (holding that personal jurisdiction is established if litigant is served with
process while inside the court's jurisdiction regardless of how briefly and for what reason he
entered the state).
37. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957)
(quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). According to McGee, international commerce and
interstate travel called for a more complex scheme to determine the extent of personal jurisdiction
than what was used previously. Id. at 222-23. As the name "International Shoe Company"
belies, the fiction of corporate persons and increasing prevalence of interstate and international
commerce created many scenarios in which a forum state was deprived of jurisdiction over
meritorious claims under the former antiquated definitions of personal jurisdiction. Id.
38. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311.
39. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))
40. See, e.g., Michael L. Russell, Note, Back to the Basics: Resisting Novel and Extreme
Approaches to the Law of Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 157, 166
(1999) (stating that International Shoe required courts to ask two questions: "(1) whether the
defendant had minimum contacts with the forum, and (2) whether sustaining jurisdiction would
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"').
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A. Bifurcation within Personal Jurisdiction
Although International Shoe is credited as the progenitor of modem
personal jurisdiction,4 1 it was an article written in Harvard Law Review
42
twenty-one years later that truly established the modem-day framework for
personal jurisdiction.43 In what began largely as an academic exercise,
Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman proposed a new system
of terminology for jurisdictional issues in their 1966 article. 44  Coining the
terms "specific jurisdiction" and "general jurisdiction," however, did more
than just change civil procedure's lexicon-it had a profound effect on the way
practitioners and academics analyzed personal jurisdiction.45
According to von Mehren and Trautman, personal jurisdiction consists of
two distinct categories: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. 46 A court
has general jurisdiction when the out-of-state defendant's contacts with the
forum state are extensive enough to allow litigation over any dispute,
regardless of whether the claim arises from a particular contact within the
forum. 4 7 On the other hand, a court has specific jurisdiction when the out-of-
state defendant has limited contacts within the state, but the litigation being, 48
brought has some connection to the defendant's specific contacts. To
exercise personal jurisdiction, the article argued, courts must establish one of
these two circumstances.49
Eighteen years after its publication, Professors von Mehren and Trautman's
dichotomous approach to personal jurisdiction was formally adopted by the
Supreme Court in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.5"
4 1. See George Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001 SUP.
CT. REv. 347, 347 ("The modem law of personal jurisdiction owes its existence, and most of its
structure and detail, to Chief Justice Stone's magisterial opinion in International Shoe v.
Washington.").
42. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 4, at 1121-23.
43. See HAZARD, supra note 33, at 172.
44. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 4, at 1121-23, 1136, 1144.
45. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
119, 119-20; B. Glenn George, supra note 35, at 1099-1100; Mary Twitchell, The Myth of
General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 610, 610-13 (1988).
46. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 4, at 1136.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1144-45.
49. See id at 1136.
50. See 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984). In Helicopteros, the Court wrote that "[w]hen a
controversy is related to or 'arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum," the Court has
established the "essential foundation" of specific personal jurisdiction. Id. at 414 (citing Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). The Court's formulation of specific jurisdiction closely
mirrored the view expressed by von Mehren and Trautman. Id. at 414 & n.8 (citing von Mehren
and Trautman as the authority on specific jurisdiction). In the event that the cause of action does
not arise out of or relate to the nonresident's activities within the forum state, the Court stated that
general personal jurisdiction could be met if there were continuous and systematic contacts
between the forum state and the nonresident. Id. at 414 & n.9.
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Regrettably, the parties in Helicopteros conceded that the plaintiffs' claims
against the defendant did not arise out of, or relate to, the company's activities
in the forum state. 51 Consequently, the majority opinion avoided any further
analysis of specific jurisdiction.
52
B. Development of the Two-Prong Approach of Specific Personal Jurisdiction:
The First Prong
To establish specific personal jurisdiction, a court must satisfy the two-prong
approach rooted in International Shoe and explicated in Burger King and later
cases. 53 In the first prong, the court must determine whether the controversy is
sufficiently connected to the activities of the out-of-state actor.54 This is often
referred to as the minimum contacts requirement.55
Although it took more than a decade to reach the Supreme Court, the doctrine of specific and
general jurisdiction was embraced by lower courts and academia almost immediately after its
publication. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Int'l Criminal Police Org., 672 F.2d 927, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(citing von Mehren and Trautman); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
651 F.2d 877, 889 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing von Mehren and Trautman's theory of specific and
general jurisdiction); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1088 (D. Kan. 1978),
rev'd, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979) (referencing von Mehren and Trautman's jurisdiction
terminology).
51. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415.
52. Id. at 415-16. The respondent's concession is particularly frustrating for those seeking
mandatory authority on the matter, because by modem standards the claims in Helicopteros may
in fact have arisen out of, or were at least related to, the defendant's limited contacts with the
forum state. See id. at 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Helicopteros was brought about after a helicopter carrying four employees of a Peruvian
consortium crashed. Id. at 410 (majority opinion). Survivors of the decedents sued the
Colombian owner of the helicopter for damages in a Texas court. Id. at 412. The chief executive
officer of Helicol had only visited Texas one time to meet with the decedents' employer to
negotiate the contract, which Helicol was performing at the time of the crash. Id. at 410. The
dissent argued that the contacts between the defendant and Texas were "sufficiently related to the
underlying cause of action[,]" and therefore, it was reasonable for the court to assert personal
jurisdiction over Helicol. Id at 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[D]ue process requires
only that . . . a defendant . . . have certain minimum contacts with [a forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980) (reaffirming that a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant only so long as minimum contacts are present and litigation would
not offend notions of fair play or reasonableness); J. Christopher Gooch, Note, The Internet,
Personal Jurisdiction, and the Federal Long-Arm Statute: Rethinking the Concept of Jurisdiction,
15 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 635, 643 (1998) ("In making the jurisdiction doctrine more flexible,
the United States Supreme Court established a two prong test for personal jurisdiction due
process .... ); Russell, supra note 40 at 165.
54. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Helicopteros, 466 U.S.
at 414; Int 'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
55. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (requiring minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction);
see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1987); Burger
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The quantity of such contacts is largely inconsequential.56  In fact, a single
qualifying minimum contact is enough to subject an out-of-state actor to
litigation within the forum state.57  The true test is whether the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity is proportionate to the obligations and
benefits granted by the forum state.5 8  In International Shoe, the Court
reasoned that a person purposely enjoying the benefits and protection of a
state's laws must also expect to bear certain obligations that "arise out of or are
connected with the activities" as well. 59
In order to be a valid minimum contact, the Supreme Court requires that the
would-be litigant's contact within the forum state was purposely directed
toward that state, and that the relationship between this minimum contact and
the resultant claim were connected to such a degree that the defendant could
reasonably anticipate litigation in the forum state on the claim.60  This
compound prerequisite is often broken down into three conditions referred to
as the purposeful availment requirement, the relatedness requirement, and the
reasonableness requirement. This Note focuses primarily on the relatedness
requirement.
Throughout different opinions, the Supreme Court has used terminology
such as "connect," 62 "arise," 63 "substantial connection," 64 and "relate ' 65 to
describe the degree of relation required between contact and claim in order to
King, 471 U.S. at 474; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770, 771 (1984); Gooch, supra note 53.
56. 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 448 (2001) ("[T]he test is qualitative, rather
than quantitative, as to whether the necessary minimum contacts exist."); see also Burger King,
471 U.S. at 475 n.18; Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
57. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 n. 18 (stating that even a lone contact can be sufficient to
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant).
58. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 ("Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon
the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
[forum state's] laws .... ").
59. Id. World-Wide Volkswagen takes this rationale further by emphasizing the importance
of such predictability under the Due Process clause. World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). The Court explained that out-of-state actors must be able to control
their exposure to liability by structuring their conduct within foreign states. Id.
60. See Russell D. Shurtz, Comment, www.international-shoe.com: Analyzing Weber v.
Jolly Hotels'Paradigm for Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 1998 BYU L. REv. 1663, 1669-
70 (describing the concept of purposeful availment, relatedness, and reasonableness).
61. See id The controversial decision of O'Connor turns upon the court's analysis of the
relatedness requirement. See infra Parts II.B.2 and III.B.
62. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
63. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958);
Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
64. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987); Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 475; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252; McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957).
65. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; Shaffer v. Heimer, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977).
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satisfy the relatedness requirement of minimum contacts. Although similar,
each term connotes varying degrees of relation and has caused a serious rift
among federal courts. There are at least four distinct interpretations.
1. The Proximate Cause Test
The proximate cause test is the most restrictive standard used to scrutinize
the connection between contacts and claims. 67  This approach to minimum
contacts can be traced back to Supreme Court cases requiring claims to arise
from the contested contact.68 Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals
for the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits have all adopted this approach to
some degree.
69
Courts relying on the proximate cause test require that the defendant's
minimum contact with the forum state be the proximate, or legal, cause of the
plaintiffs cause of action. In other words, the harm alleged by the plaintiff
must be the direct and foreseeable result of the defendant's activities in the
forum state.71
Proponents of this test find proximate cause to be a superior benchmark for
two reasons. 72  First, proximate cause "clearly distinguishes between
foreseeable and unforeseeable risks of harm., 73  This distinction between
foreseeable and unforeseeable risks is relevant because previous Supreme
Court opinions indicate that the ability to foresee whether an actor's contact
within the forum state could result in exposure to liability is 'critical to [the]
66. See infra Part I.B.1-4.
67. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 318 (3d Cir. 2007).
68. For examples of Supreme Court cases using the concept of claims that arise out of
contact with a forum state see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414;
Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 89 (1978); Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252; Int'l Shoe, 326
U.S. at 319.
69. See, e.g., Mass. Sch. of Law v. ABA, 142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that "a
claim must 'arise out of... [the] defendant's in-forum activities); Sybaritic, Inc. v. Interport Int'l,
Inc., 957 F.2d 522, 524-25 (8th Cir. 1992) (using the phrase "aris[ing] out of' to describe the
defendant's contacts with the forum"); Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int'l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256,
1258-59 (1st Cir. 1990) (considering whether the harm "arose out of' the defendant's contacts
with the state); Pearrow v. Nat'l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 1983)
(focusing on the phrase "ar[i]s[ing] out of'); Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317,
321-22 (2d Cir. 1964) (considering whether the action "'ar[o]s[e] from business [transacted]
within the forum state"').
70. See Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal Jurisdiction
and the Internet, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1839-40 (2003) ("[T]he proximate cause approach
demands a causal relationship between the contacts that satisfied the first prong and the cause of
action.").
71. Lawrence W. Moore, The Relatedness Problem in Specific Jurisdiction, 37 IDAHO L.
REV. 583, 591 (2001) ("[T]he defendant's contact must have directly caused the claim that the
plaintiff is bringing.").
72. See Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining that the
First Circuit is recognized as the "main proponent of the proximate cause standard").
73. Id. (citing Peckham v. Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co. 895 F.2d 830, 836 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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due process analysis."' 74 Second, if the touchstone of personal jurisdiction is
predictability, then asserting jurisdiction over defendants only for foreseeable
harm is more equitable than holding defendants responsible for every
unforeseeable effect that may occur.75
Outcomes from the proximate cause test deviate from those produced by
other tests primarily in situations where the plaintiffs cause of action is in
negligence and the contested minimum contact is contractual.7 6 Under these
circumstances, courts strictly applying the proximate cause test will find that
the plaintiffs claim does not legally arise from the defendant's activities, and
thus fails the relatedness test.
77
2. "But-For" Test
The but-for test is a less stringent approach because it does not rely on
foreseeability. 78 Instead, it considers whether the plaintiffs claim would have
occurred but for the defendant's contact within the forum state. 79 Such an
74. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
75. See Nowak, 94 F.3d at 715 (stressing that foreseeability and proximate cause go hand-
in-hand).
76. See, e.g., Pearrow v. Nat'l Life & Accident Ins. Co, 703 F.2d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 1983)
(dismissing a slip-and-fall case because the cause of action did not arise out of the defendant's
activities in the forum state, and therefore found no basis for specific personal jurisdiction).
Several other cases support the contention that for the purpose of personal jurisdiction, slip-and-
fall claims specifically do not arise out of the defendant's business activities in the forum. See,
e.g., Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 430 (lst Cir. 1986) (noting that the plaintiffs
reservation, a contract, had virtually nothing to do with the slip and fall); Gelfand v. Tanner
Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1964) (discussing that the sale of a ticket was
in no way connected to the tort).
77. See, e.g., Marino, 793 F.2d at 430 (holding that "vague allegations" of a hotel
reservation cannot support personal jurisdiction for a tort action); Pearrow, 703 F.2d at 1069
("This connection is too tenuous."); Gelfand, 339 F.2d at 321-22 (denying personal jurisdiction
"over a personal injury claim or anything like such slender grounds").
78. See, e.g., Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1270 n.21 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.
1981) (rejecting the defendant's view that a "tort suit cannot arise from a contractual contact").
79. See id. ("Logically, there is no reason why a tort cannot grow out of a contractual
contact. In a case like this, the contractual contact is a 'but for' causative factor for the tort since
it brought the parties within tortious 'striking distance' of each other."). In torts, the theory of
causation in fact, or but-for causation, is often referred to by the Latin phrase "sine qua non."
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 259 (11 th ed. 2005).
This translates to "without which not" and is defined as "[an indispensable condition or thing;
something on which something else necessarily depends." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1418 (8th
ed. 2004)
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80 81 82approach has been adopted by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals.
8 3
Outcomes under the but-for test deviate from those produced by the other
tests in situations where the defendant's contacts cause a third party to harm
the plaintiff.84 Under these circumstances, courts strictly applying the but-for
test will find relatedness, because but for the defendant's contact, the plaintiff s
claim would not have arisen. 
5
3. Substantial Connection Test
Unlike the but-for or proximate cause tests, courts using the substantial
connection test do not rely solely on the presence of causation between contact
and claim to satisfy the relatedness requirement. 86 Instead, these courts apply a
broader analysis by examining whether the connection between the contact and
the complaint is substantially relevant.87  Proponents of the substantialconnection test derive their authority from Supreme Court cases requiring the
80. See Prejean, 652 F.2d at 1270 n.21.
81. See Creech v. Roberts, 908 F.2d 75, 80 (6th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the plaintiff
would never have undergone surgery but for viewing the television program advertising the
procedure); Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endontics, 843 F.2d 901, 909 (6th Cir. 1988) (using the term
"but for" in explaining the defendant's contacts).
82. See Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209, 1216 (7th Cir. 1984)
(explaining that the "transaction of any business" in the state will suffice for purposes of personal
jurisdiction analysis).
83. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) (explicitly
adopting the but-for test), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). The Ninth Circuit is one
of the most adamant proponents of the but-for test. See Nowak v. Tak How Inv., Ltd., 94 F.3d
708, 714 (1st Cir. 1996). According to the Ninth Circuit, proximate cause is too restrictive a test
for relatedness. See Shute, 897 F.2d at 385; see also Nowak, 94 F.3d at 715 ("strict adherence to
a proximate cause standard in all circumstances is unnecessarily restrictive"). Alternatively,
under but-for causation analysis, any contact counts as a minimum contact as long as it is
responsible for the harm alleged. See, e.g., Deluxe Ice Cream Co., 726 F.2d at 1216 (permitting
injuries that merely "lie in the wake" of a contact).
84. See Nowak, 94 F.3d at 716 (suggesting that normally the proximate cause test would not
be satisfied, but that a more lenient approach akin to the but-for test would be sufficient for
jurisdiction).
85. Int'l, Ltd. v. Ashworth, Inc., 132 F.3d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The 'arising from'
clause in the [Massachusetts long-arm statute] is to be generously construed in favor of asserting
personal jurisdiction by applying the following 'but for' causation test: Did the defendant's
contacts with [Massachusetts] constitute 'the first step in a train of events that result[ed] in
personal injury[?]"').
86. See Third Nat'l Bank v. Wedge Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the relatedness requirement requires only that the claim have a "substantial
connection with" the defendant's in-state contacts, rather than proximate or legal causation); cf
Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endontics, 843 F.2d 901, 909 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the relatedness
requirement was satisfied when the claim was "made possible by" defendant's in-state contacts).
87. See Third Nat'l Bank, 882 F.2d at 1091 (using the term "substantial connection");
Lanier, 843 F.2d at 909 (focusing on whether the defendant's connection with the forum was
"substantial enough").
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defendant's contact to "relate to''8s or have a "substantial connection" with the
plaintiff's claim. s9 Notable opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have adopted this approach. 90
One Third Circuit opinion in particular relied on Burger King as its authority
for the substantial connection test.9 1 In Mellon Bank, the court drew from
Burger King when it evaluated the existence of specific jurisdiction by
focusing on whether a contractual agreement constituted a sufficient minimum
contact.9 The court recognized that causation alone was insufficient, and that
the Constitution requires a more flexible analysis that considers the unique
circumstances of each situation.
93
Thus the substantial connection test is different from other relatedness tests
because it does not rely on bright-line factors such as causation. 94  By
considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the contact,
proponents argue that courts are not entangled in all-or-nothing tests that are
inevitably over or under inclusive.
95
88. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
213 (1977).
89. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987); Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 475; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); see also Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)
(using the phrase "connected with").
90. See Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that the defendant's
contract with a resident could be a sufficient nexus to allow personal jurisdiction); Third Nat 7
Bank, 882 F.2d at 1091.
91. Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992).
92. Id. In Mellon Bank, the circuit court found that:
The fact that a non-resident has contracted with a resident of the forum state is not, by
itself, sufficient to justify personal jurisdiction over the nonresident. The requisite
contacts, however, may be supplied by the terms of the agreement, the place and
character of prior negotiations, contemplated future consequences, or the course of
dealings between the parties.
Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479).
93. Id.
94. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1945). International Shoe
warned against the use of "mechanical or quantitative" tests to determine personal jurisdiction,
and proponents of the substantial connection test have abided to the fullest extent. Id; see also
Remick, 238 F.3d at 256 ("In determining jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim, we must
consider the totality of the circumstances ....").
95. See, e.g., Thomason v. Chemical Bank, 661 A.2d 595, 603-04 (Conn. 1995) (noting that
its approach was less restrictive than the "causal connection" approach, but more restrictive "than
the federal constitutional test for general jurisdiction, under which this state could have elected to
exercise jurisdiction over causes of action wholly unrelated to the defendant's conduct in this
forum").
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4. The Sliding Scale Test
The fourth approach for testing the relatedness requirement is called the
sliding scale test. 6 Under the sliding scale test, "'the weaker the plaintiffs
showing of minimum contacts, the less the defendant need show in terms of
unreasonableness to defeat jurisdiction."' 97 Though used sparingly in modem
courts,98 the sliding scale test has been the subject of several academic
commentaries since the Helicopteros decision in 1984.99
According to proponents of the sliding scale test, the Court's inability to find
personal jurisdiction in the Helicopteros case illustrated the flaw of using
specific and general jurisdiction as mutually exclusive doctrines. 00 Under the
sliding scale test, general jurisdiction sits on one end and specific jurisdiction
on the other.101 Courts consider the defendant's activities as a whole to
determine what degree of relation between those contacts and the plaintiffs
claim is required to satisfy the relatedness requirement.10 2 This means that a
court can weigh the "quantity and quality of the defendant's forum contacts"
against the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction. 
103
96. William M. Richman, Part l-Casad's Jurisdiction in Civil Actions, Part I1-A Sliding
Scale to Supplement the Distinction between General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CAL. L. REV.
1328, 1345-46 (1984) (reviewing ROBERT CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS (1983)).
97. TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd., 488 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th
Cir. 2007) ("'the reasonableness prong of the due process inquiry evokes a sliding scale"')
(quoting OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1092 (10th Cir. 1998));
see also Richman, supra note 96, at 1345 ("As the quantity and quality of the defendant's forum
contacts increase, a weaker connection between the plaintiff's claim and those contacts is
permissible; as the quantity and quality of the defendant's forum contacts decrease, a stronger
connection between the plaintiffs claim and those contacts is required.").
98. For an example of cases using the sliding scale see TH Agric., 488 F.3d at 1287
(discussing the use of the sliding scale to determine the reasonableness prong); Chew v. Dietrich,
143 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1998) (calling for flexibility in the relatedness requirement); LAK, Inc.
v. Deer Creek Enters., 885 F.2d 1293, 1303 (6th Cir. 1989) (suggesting a sliding scale might have
been appropriate if the contacts were more substantial); Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926
P.2d 1085, 1096-97 (Cal. 1996) (declining to follow the substantial nexus test); Shoppers Food
Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 336 (D.C. 2000) (requiring only a "discernible
relationship").
99. See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Fuzzy Logic and the Sliding Scale Theorem, 53 ALA. L.
REV. 421, 438 (2002); William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 599, 615 (1993); Richman, supra note 96, at 1336; Flavio Rose, Comment, Related Contacts
and Personal Jurisdiction: The "But For" Test, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1545, 1584 (1994).
100. Richman, supra note 96, at 1330-45.
101. Id. at 1340, 1345.
102. Id. at 1341.
103. Id. at 1345. This test has failed to find a foothold outside of theoretical jurisprudence
because it is at odds with Supreme Court precedent, which largely favors a strict dichotomy
between general and specific jurisdiction. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS
306 (4th ed. 2004) (writing that the Supreme Court still favors a "fairly sharp dichotomy"
between general and specific jurisdiction, and that this precedent is at odds with the sliding scale
test).
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C. Development of the Two-Prong Approach of Specific Jurisdiction: The
Second Prong
Regardless of a court's analysis under the relatedness element, once a court
is satisfied with the existence of minimum contacts, the court must consider the
second prong.' 4 To satisfy the second prong, a judge must determine, based
on a series of factors, if haling the defending party into the court's jurisdiction
would offend traditional notions of "'fair play and substantial justice."' ' 0 5 The
Supreme Court has listed factors such as:
the burden on the defendant[;] . . . the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the dispute[;] . . . the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective reliefl;] ... the inter-state judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies[;]
. . . [and the] shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.'
0 6
Providing further insight into this prong, the plurality opinion in a later
Supreme Court case, Asahi Metal Industry Co., applied these factors to a case
involving personal jurisdiction over a Japanese company.'0 7  In Asahi, the
plurality opinion not only considered the extreme distance a Japanese company
must traverse in order to appear before a California court, but also the burdens
imposed on Japanese defendants haled into a foreign legal system.1
0 8
The Court determined that these anticipated hardships outweighed the slight
"interests ... the plaintiff and the forum State" had in finding jurisdiction over
Asahi. 10 9 As a result, Justice O'Connor found that "the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a California court over [the defendant] . . . would be
unreasonable and unfair.""
0
II. O'CONNOR V. SANDYLANE HOTEL Co.: THE OP1NION
In February 2002, lawyer Patrick J. O'Connor and his wife took a trip to
Barbados."' On the recommendation of friends and travel agents, they stayed
104. See Burger King's Bifurcated Test, supra note 35, at 954 (stating that most courts follow
a two-part analysis in which the reasonableness inquiry is the second prong after minimum
contacts).
105. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)); see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
775-80 (1984).
106. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (internal
citations omitted); see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477; Keeton, 465 U.S. 775-80.
107. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
108. Id.
109. Id. The fact that the plaintiff in Asahi was not a citizen of California also weighed
heavily against the court's interest in hearing the dispute. Id.
110. Id.
111. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 2007).
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at the Sandy Lane Hotel in St. James parish.' 12 After their trip, the O'Connors
decided to return to Sandy Lane the following year. 1 3 Shortly after booking
their second reservation, the resort mailed a brochure to the O'Connors' home
promoting Sandy Lane's spa services.' 14 The brochure strongly recommended
that guests make reservations for spa treatments in advance of their arrival.1 
15
After perusing the brochure, the O'Connors made reservations for the various
spa services." 6 Through a series of phone calls both to and from Barbados, the
O'Connors and Sandy Lane settled on dates, times, and prices for particular
spa services. 1'
7
On February 26, 2003, while staying at the hotel, Mr. O'Connor arrived for a
scheduled appointment at the spa. 118 As part of the service, Mr. O'Connor was
invited to use the shower in a personalized treatment suite. 19 Unfortunately,
Mr. O'Connor's feet were slippery from the oils applied during his massage,
and the shower floor was not outfitted with mats. 12 As he entered the shower,
Mr. O'Connor "slipped, fell, and tore his rotator cuff.' 12'
A. Procedural Posture
Upon their return to Pennsylvania, Mr. and Mrs. O'Connor filed actions in
negligence against Sandy Lane in the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia
County. 122 Sandy Lane removed the case to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and filed a motion for summary
judgment. 123 On the matter of specific jurisdiction, Judge Joyner's ensuing
district court opinion held that the plaintiffs' "cause[s] of action [do] not arise
112. Id Despite its modest name, Sandy Lane Hotel is a luxurious five-star Caribbean resort,
frequented by "royalty, movie stars, and many of the business world's most discerning
personalities." See Sandy Lane-Luxury Golf and Spa Resort at St. James in Barbados,
http://www.sandylane.com/introduction/index.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2008).






119. Id. The hotel advertises that "[t]he Spa at Sandy Lane features 11 personalized
treatment suites each with shower, bathroom and either outdoor garden, private hydro pool or
skylight." Sandy Lane Facilities Page, http://www.sandylane.com/spa/facilities.html (last visited
Aug. 13, 2008).
120. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 316; see also Duffy, supra note 28.
121. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 316.
122. Id. Mrs. O'Connor was a co-plaintiffand alleged a loss of consortium. Id at 317 n.3.
123. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., No. 04-2436, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7397, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 28, 2005), rev'd 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007). Judge J. Curtis Joyner rightly pointed out
that the motion was more accurately recognized as a 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Id. at *5.
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from Defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania."'
124 The case was dismissed,125
and the O'Connors appealed.
126
B. The Third Circuit's Opinion
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit began its analysis
by acknowledging that the O'Connors conceded at oral argument that Sandy
Lane Hotel lacked the "continuous and systematic" contacts necessary to
support general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.' 27 The court then moved
on to assess the case in terms of specific personal jurisdiction. 128 The opinion
divided this anal ysis into three parts: purposeful direction, relatedness, and
reasonableness.
124. Id. at *4. More specifically, the alleged minimum contacts in question were Sandy
Lane's phone calls, e-mails, and brochure mailings to the O'Connor residence regarding Mr.
O'Connor's spa appointment. Id. The district court based its ruling on deficiencies in all of these
alleged minimum contacts. Id. at *4-5. First, the court found that the brochure mailed to the
plaintiff's home was not a minimum contact, because the plaintiff never alleged that the brochure
induced him to make a spa appointment. Id. at *4. The court held that without a sufficient causal
connection between the contact and the claim, there was no minimum contact. Id. Second, with
regard to the formation of a contract over the phone for spa services, Judge Joyner cited three
federal opinions from within the Third Circuit that held that contractual contacts with the forum
state could not give rise to specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when the
claim was in negligence. See id. (citing Gehling v. St. George's Sch. of Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d 539,
544 (3d Cir. 1985); Scheidt v. Young, 389 F.2d 58, 60 (3d Cir. 1968); Wims v. Beach Terrace
Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 267 (E.D. Pa. 1991)). Because neither the mailings to the
home nor the reservations made over the phone could satisfy as minimum contacts, the case was
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at * 12.
125. Id. at *11-12. To be more precise, before being dismissed entirely, the case was first
transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, because the
court misunderstood New York as the location of two Sandy Lane representatives. Id. at *2-3.
This mistake was corrected by the court two months later, however, when the court discovered
that Sandy Lane did not have any representatives in New York. Id.
126. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 2007).
127. Id. at 317. Although the plaintiffs conceded their contention that Sandy Lane Hotel was
subject to general jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a notable portion of their
appellant brief did present such a claim. Id. at 315 n. I. The O'Connors' argument for general
jurisdiction, however, appears unsubstantiated in consideration of the fact that Sandy Lane's only
ongoing and systematic contacts with Pennsylvania included "five business trips to Philadelphia
by Sandy Lane employees, the mailing of newsletters to approximately 800 Pennsylvania
addresses, and Sandy Lane's relationships with public relations and marketing firms in New York
City. Id. at 315 (citing Plaintiffs' Brief at 6-8, 21-23).
128. Id. at317.
129. Id. This three prong analysis appears to stray from the two prong test of International
Shoe and subsequent Supreme Court cases, but many lower courts have adopted this style, which
has no substantive distinction from the form found in International Shoe. See infra notes 163-64
and accompanying text.
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1. Identifying Purposefully Directed Contacts
First, the court identified Sandy Lane Hotel's actions within the forum state
that could have constituted minimum contacts.' 30  The court determined that
the seasonal newsletters mailed to the O'Connors' Pennsylvania home, the spa
brochure sent shortly after the O'Connors made reservations for February
2003, and the phone calls and e-mails traded between the two parties "for the
purpose of forming an agreement to render spa services" constituted
purposeful contacts directed at the forum state.' 31 The court found that Sandy
Lane deliberately targeted the O'Connors while they were within the
geographic boundaries of Pennsylvania. 1
32
2. Satisfying the Relatedness Requirement
The court next addressed the second requirement of specific personal
jurisdiction, the relatedness requirement.' 33 In order to be sufficiently related,
the court stated that the O'Connors' claims must "'arise out of or relate to"' at
least one of the defendant's purposefully directed contacts.' 34  The court's
analysis began by laying out and then systematically rejecting the three
predominant approaches adopted by the lower federal courts: the proximate
cause test, the but-for test, and the hybrid test.'
35
Initially, the court pointed out that even though previous Third Circuit
precedent failed to categorically adopt "a definitive approach to the relatedness
requirement,"' 136 in Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, the court had held that a
defendant's minimum contacts were not required to be the legal cause of the
plaintiffs injuries. 37 Although the court stopped short of "adopting a bright-
line test" for relatedness, the O'Connor decision claimed that the Miller court
was resolute in its rejection of the proximate cause test.'
38
130. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 318.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 320.
134. Id. at 317 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 (1984); Grimes v. Vitalink Commc'ns, 17 F.3d 1553, 1559 (3d Cir. 1994)).
135. Id. at 318-21. The court combined the substantial connection test and the sliding scale
test as a single approach. See id. at 321 (asserting that a "hybrid approach" such as the sliding
scale or the substantial connection test is not the law in the Third Circuit).
136. Id. at 320. The court lamented the fact that the Supreme Court failed to further expound
upon this requirement. See id. at 318. The opinion also claimed that there was a dearth of
authority in the Third Circuit. Id at 320 ("This Court has never adopted a definitive approach to
the relatedness requirement."). This, however, may not be entirely accurate. See Remick v,
Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2001); Mellon Bank (East) PSFS Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino,
960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992). The O'Connor court's failure to draw from, or at the very
least, distinguish, these precedential rulings is mysterious.
137. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 320 (citing Miller v. Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 99-
100 (3d Cir. 2004)).
138. See id.; Miller, 384 F.3d at 99.
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Next, the O'Connor opinion rejected the hybrid test as being contrary to
Third Circuit law.' 39 The court described the approach as one that merged the
general and specific jurisdiction doctrines together in a "freewheeling totality-
of-the-circumstances test."' 140 The O'Connor opinion criticized this method for
allowing courts to adjust "the scope of the relatedness requirement according
to the 'quantity and quality' of the defendant's contacts."
14'
Lastly, the court voiced its dissatisfaction with the but-for test. 142 The court
acknowledged that the but-for test kept the doctrines of specific and general
jurisdiction separate,143 but explained that the fatal shortcoming of the test was
that it had "'no limiting principle; it literally embraces every event that
hindsight can logically identify in the causative chain." '144  The court did
acknowledge that most courts that rely on the but-for test temper the test's over
inclusiveness by emphasizing the reasonableness requirement of the personal
jurisdiction analysis. 4 5  Nevertheless, Judge Chagares expressed doubt that
this was sufficient to salvage the test, given that but-for causation has "more
holes than the [reasonableness requirement] can plug.'
146
Having rejected all three established relatedness tests, the court crafted its
own method. 147 The court stated that the central function of the relatedness
requirement is to maintain balance between the obligations and benefits that
accompany an actor's presence in a forum state. 148 According to the court, this
means that the relatedness requirement is satisfied when a "meaningful link
exists between a legal obligation that arose in the forum and the substance of
the plaintiffs claims."'
149
The court began its method by applying the but-for test to Sandy Lane's
contacts within Pennsylvania.1 50 The court found that Mr. O'Connor "decided
to purchase spa treatments 'as a result' of [defendant's] solicitation. 151
139. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 321.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 322.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996)). In the
words of William L. Prosser, "the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events and
beyond." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 234 (W. Page
Keeton et al., eds., 5th ed. 1984).
145. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 322.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 320-21.
148. Id. at 323.
149. Id. at 323-24.
150. See id at 322-23 ("[B]ut-for causation provides a useful starting point for the
relatedness inquiry.").
151. Id. at 323. It is difficult to believe that the spa brochure mailed to the O'Connor's home
was the sine qua non of Mr. O'Connor's shower injury, but this is the assertion made by the
plaintiffs in the district court. See id at 323. And although the plaintiff usually would bear the
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Therefore, Sandy Lane's brochure was the but-for cause, for the reason that
without the solicitation, Mr. O'Connor would not have purchased a spa
treatment and injured himself in the shower.'
52
The court also held that the defendant's mailings and phone calls regarding
the spa reservations were sufficient to establish minimum contacts with
Pennsylvania. 53 These conversations constituted the formation of a contract,
and under Pennsylvania law, certain obligations and benefits arise from such
activities. 154 One of those obligations, asserted the court, was the implicit
guarantee that Sandy Lane would exercise due care during the performance of
the contract.1 55 The O'Connors claimed that Sandy Lane's failure to exercise
due care "directly and closely relate[d]" to the hotel's contractual obligation.
56
In short, the court equated the plaintiffs' claim to the defendant's oblifation,
assumed when the hotel made contractual contact with the forum state.
3. Satisfying the Reasonableness Requirement
The court then briefly assessed the reasonableness requirement. 58  The
O'Connor opinion noted that the establishment of minimum contacts made
jurisdiction presumptively constitutional, and that only the most compelling
case would render jurisdiction offensive to "'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' 159 The court held that the presumption of constitutionality
had not been rebutted.'
60
burden of convincing the court of such a fact, the district court's failure to hold an evidentiary
hearing diminished that burden to the point that "'the plaintiff[s] need only establish a prima facie
case of personal jurisdiction and ... [are] entitled to have [their] allegations taken as true and all
factual disputes drawn in [their] favor."' See id. at 316 (quoting Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v.
Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004)) (alteration in original). Thus, for the purpose of appellate
review, the circuit court had to assume that the brochure was a but-for cause of Mr. O'Connor's
decision to book a massage. Id. at 323 ("We accept that statement as true because the District
Court held no evidentiary hearing .... Thus, but for the mailing of the brochure, Mr. O'Connor
never would have purchased a massage, and he would not have suffered a massage-related
injury." (internal citation omitted)).
152. Id. at 323.
153. Id. at 322-24.




158. Id. at 324-25.
159. Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
160. Id. at 325. The court admitted that many of the reasonableness factors weighed in the
defendant's favor, especially the distance needed to travel between Barbados and Pennsylvania,
the burden of familiarizing itself with a foreign legal system, and the substantive interest
Barbados courts had in presiding over litigation involving corporations domiciled within its
boundaries and events occurring on it its own soil. See id. at 324-25. Nonetheless, the Third
Circuit found these factors insufficient to outweigh the presumption that trial in Pennsylvania was
just. See id. at 325.
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Having analyzed the facts of the case under all three elements of the specific
personal jurisdiction doctrine, the court held that Pennsylvania courts could
rightfully exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Sandy Lane Hotel.
161
The Third Circuit court reversed the lower court's order and remanded the case
to district court for further proceedings.
162
III. ANALYSIS OF THE O'CONNOR OPINION
Though the O'Connor opinion has been credited with settling the law on
personal jurisdiction in the Third Circuit,' 63 it has fallen well short of that
mark, and in doing so, highlights a common problem in the analysis of specific
personal jurisdiction.
A. Form Versus Substance: Two Prongs or Three Requirements?
In its assessment of specific personal jurisdiction, the Third Circuit's
application of a three element approach was a significant divergence from the
two prong test established by International Shoe and found in the Supreme
Court's traditional analysis. 164 However, this tripartite structure is commonly
applied by district and circuit courts across the federal judicial system, 65 and
appears to deviate from the Supreme Court merely in form rather than
substance. By splitting the minimum contacts prong into the two steps of
purposeful direction and relatedness, courts can more easily focus on the two
mutually exclusive and equally critical elements described in International
Shoe.1 6V The O'Connor opinion's delineation may clash with the outlines of
first-year law students, but it is a well-established structure among
practitioners.1
67
161. Id. at 325.
162. Id.
163. Duffy, supra note 28 (noting that the O'Connor opinion sought to clarify the doctrine of
personal jurisdiction).
164. Compare Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring minimum
contacts and the satisfaction of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice), with
O'Connor, 496 U.S. at 317 ("The inquiry as to whether specific jurisdiction exists has three parts.
First, the defendant must have 'purposefully directed [its] activities at the forum.' Second, the
litigation must 'arise out of or relate to' at least one of those activities. And third, if the prior two
requirements are met, a court may consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise
'comport[s] with fair play and substantial justice."' (alterations in original)).
165. See, e.g., Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that (1)
"the plaintiff's claim must be related to the defendant's contacts," (2) "the defendant's contacts
with the state must be purposeful," and (3) "the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable under
the circumstances" (citations omitted)).
166. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (noting that the "minimum contacts" analysis must comport
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice").
167. See, e.g., Chad Holley, Note, All Hat and No Horse? McBee v. Delica and the
Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 183, 200 n.147 (2008) ("The
Ninth Circuit has a three-part test for determining whether a defendant has had 'minimum
contacts' with the forum. The test is satisfied if '(1) the defendant has performed some act or
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B. The Court's Improper Analysis of the Three Relatedness Tests
The O'Connor opinion correctly analyzed and rejected the proximate
cause 168 and but-for tests. 169  Both of these approaches to determining
relatedness are bright-line tests similar to the "mechanical" criteria shunned by
Chief Justice Stone in International Shoe.17 0 The court erred, however, in its
analysis of what it called the hybrid tests. Under this singular classification,
the court combined two distinct approaches to the relatedness requirement: the
substantial connection test and the sliding scale test.'
71
By failing to distinguish the two tests, the court rejected the substantial
connection test for the shortcomings of the sliding scale test.1 72  In fact, the
substantial connection test is by far the purest derivative of the Supreme
Court's requirements for relatedness as first set out in International Shoe.1
7 3
consummated some transaction within the forum or otherwise purposefully availed himself of the
privileges of conducting activities in the forum, (2) the claim arises out of or results from the
defendant's forum-related activities, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable."' (quoting
Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006))).
168. See id. The proximate cause test is inappropriate because it institutes an overly stringent
relatedness requirement to compensate for a weakened reasonableness requirement. See, e.g.,
Russo v. Sea World of Florida, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 39, 42 (D.R.I. 1989) (analogizing the
questioning of whether the claim arises or relates to a contact with the issue of proximate cause in
tort law); State ex rel. La Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Wells, 657 P.2d
207, 211 (Or. 1982) (finding no personal jurisdiction because the defendant's contact in forum
state had "no relevance to the substance of this claim"); Kingsley & Keith (Canada) Ltd. v.
Mercer Int'l Corp., 456 A.2d 1333, 1338 (Pa. 1983) ("[T]he acts of the nonresident defendant
within the forum state [must] represent the factual predicates upon which a cause of action are to
be based."). The problem with proximate cause, however, is that International Shoe was not
concerned with whether the defendant's contact was the proximate cause or factual predicate of
the plaintiffs claim. See Int 'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (requiring only that a court find nonresident
defendants accountable for the obligations that "arise out of or are connected with" their activities
inside the forum state). Given that the majority opinions in Asahi, Burger King, Helicopteros,
World-Wide Volkswagen, Hanson, McGee, and International Shoe all avoided using the term
"legal causation" when discussing relatedness, the Court's language suggests that other
relationships between the contact and the claim can also create sufficient minimum contacts for
the sake of specific jurisdiction. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
169. See O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 322 ("But-for causation cannot be the sole measure of
relatedness because it is vastly overinclusive in its calculation of a defendant's reciprocal
obligations."), The but-for test is flawed because mere connection through a causal chain does
not always indicate a sufficient degree of relationship between contact and claim to notify a
defendant that he should "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." See id.; see also
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). -
170. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
478, 485 (1985) (rejecting any "mechanical tests" or "talismanic . . . formulas" for the
determination of personal jurisdiction).
171. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 322 (listing both the substantial connection test and the sliding
scale test as part of the same hybrid group).
172. Id. at 321-22 (finding the hybrid test too unstructured).
173. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. In International Shoe, the Court
generally referred to the defendant's connection to the forum. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 ("The
exercise of that privilege [to do business within a state] may give rise to obligations, and, so far as
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By considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the contact, and
not merely whether it is the cause of the claim, courts can consistently
determine whether there is a substantial connection among the defendant, the
claim, and the forum.
174
Furthermore, the substantial connection test wholly avoids mechanical,
bright-line determinations. 175 The O'Connor opinion rejected the substantial
connection test based on the court's misinterpretation of the totality-of-the-
circumstances technique.' 76 The court believed that this approach assessed all
circumstances surrounding the entire litigation and weighed the aggregation of
all purposefully directed contacts. 177 According to the court, the lines between
general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction are unconstitutionally blurred
when such an approach is used.
178
In actuality, an appropriately applied substantial connection test would not
scrutinize all potential contacts collectively, but rather each contested contact
individually.179 For instance, if the contact in question involves a contract
between a defendant and a plaintiff, the court should examine negotiations that
led up to the contract, anticipated penalties of the contract, its terms, whether it
has been partially or fully performed, and where such performance takes
place. 18  From these additional details, a court can flesh out whether that
particular contact, the plaintiffs claim, and the forum state are all substantially
connected.18
The Supreme Court case that most closely aligns with the substantial
connection test is Burger King.182 Applying a quasi-substantial connection test
of its own, the majority opinion in Burger King refused to be bogged down by
analysis of whether the relationship between the defendants' contacts with the
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure
which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue.")
174. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 82 (arguing that courts should distinguish related contacts
from fortuitous, but unrelated, contacts).
175. See O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 320.
176. See id. at 319-21 (criticizing the totality of the circumstances test for providing "no
rigid distinction between general and specific jurisdiction").
177. Id. at 321-22 (correctly stating that a standard that mixes several factors should have no
impact on the relatedness requirement).
178. Seeid at319-20.
179. See, e.g., Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1093 (Cal. 1996) (holding
that a court may examine the defendant's individual contacts within a state).
180. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1965)).
181. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1980) (describing the rationale of the
minimum contacts test being "'the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation."' (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977))).
182. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (observing that the dispute in question grew out of a
contract that had a "substantial connection" with the forum state); see supra Part I.B.3.
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forum state and the plaintiffs claims were causally connected. 183 Similarly,
the court avoided delving into whether the cause of action arose from the
contract between the two parties.' 
84
Instead, the court took a broader view, taking into account the details of the
two parties' ongoing business relationship, and stating that a contract alone
cannot sufficiently establish minimum contacts in the state where the contact
was formed. 185 The analysis, asserts the Court, must ascertain whether the
contract had a substantial connection with the state in which it was made.
1 86
Only then can the requirements of minimum contacts be fully satisfied.
87
In Burger King, the Court closely examined the conditions surrounding the
contract between the defendant and the plaintiff to determine whether the
contact had substantial connections with the forum state.' 88 The Court found
that the defendants knew they were entering into a long-term relationship with
the plaintiff; that most, if not all, of the plaintiffs performance would occur in
the forum state; and that taxes and laws enforced by the forum state would be
controlling.' 89 The Court concluded that the defendants could have reasonably
predicted that disputes arising from the contract were just as likely to be
litigated in Florida as they were in the defendants' own state.
190
O'Connor failed to incorporate the lessons of Burger King, and therefore
missed a critical application of the substantial connection test. Although the
sliding scale test that the Third Circuit court condemned clearly defies the
personal jurisdiction doctrine, the court overreached. 191 Lumping the sliding
scale test with the substantial relationship test 192 was erroneous, and ultimately
resulted in the court overlooking good law.
C. Why the Approach Used by the Court in O'Connor Fails
The first error in the O'Connor opinion was the court's failure to elucidate
the method it ultimately adopted when it assessed the case's minimum contacts
and relatedness requirement. 193  The opinion provided very little explicit
guidance for how future courts should test the sufficiency of minimum
183. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 485-86.
184. See id
185. See id. at 479; see also Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 317 (1943)
(examining more than just the place the contract was formed).
186. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (observing that the dispute in question "grew directly of 'a
contract which had a substantial connection with [the forum state]' (quoting McGee v. Int'l Ins.




190. Id. at 482.
191. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
192. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 321 (3d Cir. 2007).
193. See id. at 323.
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contacts. 194 Furthermore, it overemphasized causation and the importance of a
contract's existence.1
95
1. An Overemphasis on Causation
By deconstructing the application of O'Connor's unexplained test, two
substantive errors are evident in the court's analysis. At its outset, the
O'Connor approach overemphasized the issue of causation, making it the
threshold factor in the relatedness requirement inquiry.196 Evaluating cause
and effect is a suitable means of testing the relationship between a claim and a
contact when assessing minimum contacts, but it should not be the exclusive197
means.
In its analysis of the relatedness requirement, the court discussed the spa
brochure as a potential minimum contact in some length. 19 Certainly, the
brochure had a but-for connection with the arising litigation, 99 but that
connection was entirely too tenuous to bear any weight in the instant case
because the brochure was not negligently written, nor was it a substantive
element of the ensuing contract.200 Because the Supreme Court has suggested
that a single contact may be insufficient if the contact is too attenuated, the
brochure cannot constitute a sufficient minimum contact standing alone.20'
2. An Overemphasis on the Existence of a Contract
The second flaw in the O'Connor test was its overemphasis on the
contractual nature of the phone calls regarding Mr. O'Connor's spa
194. Id. at 324 (offering a vague directive that there must be a "meaningful link between a
legal obligation that arose in the forum and the substance of the plaintiff's claims").
195. See id. at 323-24.
196. See id. at 323 (emphasizing the need for a "more direct causal connection than provided
by the but-for test").
197. See Helicopteros Nacionales Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 420 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (writing that the Court severely limited the type of contacts that will
satisfy the constitutional requirement by refusing to consider controversies that "relate to"
contacts as well as those that "arise out of" a defendant's contacts); Nowak v. Tak How Invs.,
Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996) ("We see no reason why, in the context of a relationship
between a contractual or business association and a subsequent tort, the absence of proximate
cause per se should always render the exercise of specific jurisdiction unconstitutional.").
198. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 318.
199. Id. at 323.
200. Id. at 316 (noting that Mr. O'Connor contracted for spa services over the phone).
201. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (suggesting that it is
unlikely that a singular act by a corporate agent would be sufficient to create personal
jurisdiction); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 n.18 (1985) (noting
that singular acts related to the forum may be insufficient if the circumstances surrounding the
acts create only an attenuated connection with the forum).
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reservation. 20 2 Contracts are not minimum contacts per se. 2 0 3 Although the
formation of a contract may establish a substantial connection between the two
parties, the relatedness analysis requires a substantial connection between the
claim, the contract, and the forum state.204 If the contract and the forum state
lack a substantial connection, the contract cannot satisfy the relatedness
requirement.
20 5
In the O'Connor case, Mr. O'Connor and Sandy Lane formed an agreement
while the plaintiff was in Pennsylvania. 206  That fact, however, does not
automatically generate a manifest interest for the commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. 207 The contract was still fully executory. 20 8 In particular, the
parties had not exchanged money or services in Pennsylvania. 20 9 This is hardly
the ongoing, substantial, inter-state business relationship found in the Supreme, • • 210
Court's Burger King analysis. It was merely an informal reservation with no
discernable impact on the state in which it was made.
If Mr. O'Connor had been on his cell phone during those phone calls and
was returning back from New York after a deposition, would it be appropriate
to allow every state along Interstate 95 to have jurisdiction over this case?
What if the call was made on a flight from Philadelphia International Airport to
Los Angeles? Surely the courts in the Midwest, Great Plains, and Rocky
Mountains would not be debating what latitudinal lines the plane flew over
when the offer, acceptance, and consideration were each established.
2 11
202. See O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 323.
203. Cf McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that due process was
satisfied because the suit was based on a contract "which had substantial connection with that
State"). Based on McGee, it can be inferred that contracts with insubstantial connections to the
state do not satisfy due process.
204. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1980) (describing the rationale of the
minimum contacts test being "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation"
(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977))).
205. See id. at 326-27.
206. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 315-16.
207. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (stating that the forum state had a manifest interest in
providing a forum because the plaintiff paid for services via mail from the forum state and was a
resident of the forum state where the contract would be performed).
208. See O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 316.
209. See id.
210. Compare Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985) ("[The defendant]
deliberately reached out beyond [his home state] and negotiated with a Florida corporation for the
purchase of a long-term franchise and the manifold benefits that would derive from the affiliation
with a nationwide organization."), with O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 321-23 (involving a singular
agreement for spa services during a vacation).
211. Admittedly, the airplane hypothesis is an extreme scenario, but it illustrates the fact that
no court should rely solely on the fact that a contract was partially formed within its boundaries
when establishing specific personal jurisdiction. See Brilmayer, supra note 174 ("A contact is
related to the controversy only if it is the geographical qualification of a fact relevant to the
merits."). Instead, courts contemplating specific jurisdiction should assess the factors
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the O'Connor opinion attempted to provide a comprehensive
analytical approach for the Third Circuit to use when addressing specific
personal jurisdiction, its approach to the relatedness requirement only muddied
the water further for future courts. O'Connor abdicates its responsibility to
provide a cohesive, constitutional approach for determining what degree of
relatedness is required between a claim and a contact. Instead of adopting the
substantial connection test, the court presents a flawed analysis that not only
obfuscates its own methodology, but incorrectly overemphasizes causation and
the existence of contracts.
For the sake of providing due process, hopefully some authoritative body in
the future recognizes the critical situation our legal system has fallen into.
Without a consistent scheme, there can be no predictability, and without
predictability, no court in this country is able to dispense personal jurisdiction
within the bounds of the Constitution.
surrounding the contract and determine whether the state has a more substantial connection with
the contact than mere physical proximity. See id.
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